United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPELLANT'S APPENDIX



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

-v.-

RICHARD PATRICK CARRIGAN,

Defendants-Appellants.:

To be argued by PHYLIS SKLOOT BAMBERGER

 $\mathcal{B}_{p_{s}}$

Docket No. 74-2056

APPENDIX FOR APPELLANT RICHARD PATRICK CARRIGAN

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK



WILLIAM J. GALLAGHER, ESQ.,
THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY
Attorney for Appellant
FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES UNIT
509 United States Court House
Foley Square
New York, New York 10007
(212) 732-2971

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_ 1974 Mar 13	Filed Indictment	-viol: 18 ISC 2	314 3	and 2-	intersta	ite transp	orta	tion o	fst	olen
-Mar 20	goods and aiding and abetting 1 ct Filed appearance bond Robert White-surety-Peerless Ins Co, Albany, no money Filed appearance bond Richard Carrigan-surety-Peerless Ins Co, Albany-no money									
Mar 18	Deft Carrigan is arraigned and pleads not guilty. Bail reduced to \$5,000 \ Deft White is arraigned and pleads not guilty. Bail reduced to \$5,000									
June 10	Trial moved by U, S. Attorney, jury drawn and sworn. Mr. French will be in NYC June 11 at 2nd CCA to argue a case so this trial is adjourned to Wednesday, June 12 at 9:30 AM									
June 12 June 13	Trial continued. Trial continued, Motion denied because he re Motion grante is excused fr Counsel for h	Govt rests. Mr. Riccio mo presents a clic d. trial in recommend for their comments and control to two or more	c. Ricoves ent in cess sidera	for con n jai to 9:3 ation stip	ontinuand, I, and i 30 AM Mod of this alate on	ce of tria s to appea nday, June case, alt record th	l un r fo 17. No. at i	til Mor bail Juron L tal	onday Lon r No: kes h event	his behalf, his behalf, 2-Poole er place. something

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DATE 1974	PROCEEDINGS
June 17	10:10 AM Mr. Riccio sums up for defts. 10:40 AM Mr. French sums up for Covt
***	11:02 AM Judge MacMahon charges the jury and they retire at 11:37 AM in charge of
	two sworn officers, to consider their verdict. Alternate juror is excused from
	further consideration of case.
	The Jury, at 3:26 PM come into court and say they find the defendants Carrigan and White CUILTY AS CHARCED. Mr. Riccio moves to set aside the verdict as to both
	defendants, on grounds stated. Motions denied. Mr. French moves to reinstate
	\$50,000 bail for each defendant. Motion denied and defendants are continued on
	\$5,000 bail pending sentence. Pre-sentence investigation ordered. Sentence set
	for July 23 at 10 A. M. in Auburn, NY
•	Filed Covt exhibits 1-4,6-8, Court exhibit 1
July 19	The Court advised defendant Carrigan of his right to speak in his own behalf, defendant
	spoke, his attorney spoke. Defendant is sentenced to be confined in any institution
	designated by the Attorney General for a period of eight years on count one. Defendant
	is granted the right to appeal, bail set at \$20,000. Remanded to custody of Marshal.
	LFMacM JS3
	The Court advised defendant White of his right to speak in his own behalf, defendant
	declined, his attorney spoke. Defendant is sentenced to be confined in any institutio
	designated by the Attorney Ceneral for a period of eight years or count one. Defendan
	is granted the right to appeal, bail set at \$20,000. Remanded to sustody of Marshal pending posting of bail. LFMacM
July 19	Filed Notice of Appeal-Carrigan
- Oury IV	Filed Notice of Appeal-White
y 23	Sent copies of docket sheet and Notices of Appeal to US Court of Appeals
	Sent copies of Notice of Appeal to US Atty
July 22	Filed Judgment-Carrigan, 2 copies Marshal, 1 cpy Probation
	Filed Judgment-White-2 copies Marshal, 1 cpy Probation
July 2	Filed Peerless Ins Co bond \$20,000. and bond form-Carrigan(for appeal)
A O	Filed Peerless Ins Co bond \$20,000 and bond form-White-appeal
Aug 2 Aug 9	Filed Forms A-Carrigan & White-signed by Judge MacMahon Filed CJA 20 form 5-Corrigan
	Filed CJA 20 form 5-White
ug 26	Filed Motion for Sept 4 to return property of defts
Aug 27	Filed notice of service of motion-certificate of service
Sept. 4	Motion for return of defendants' Property Motion granted. \$1,000 to
	Carrigan & \$1,800 to White. No opposition by gov't. Gov't to submit
	Order.
/9/74	Order signed by Judge Foley direction release of \$1800 to Robert White,
ct. 18	and \$1,000.00 to Richard Carrigan.
	Sent Certified copy of Record on Appeal to CCA, 2nd Cir.
3/31/75	/ Filed Order from U.S.Court of Appeals, second circuit dismissing
/3.1/75	Stay of sentence being vacated by above and a data and a
	Stay of sentence being vacated by above order, delivered Commitment to the U.S. Marshal.
4/18/75	Mr. Paul French heard in Argument on Motion for Revocation of Bail
	/Motion granted.
4/22/75	Filed letter from Carrigan and White requesting information on steps
	to be taken to reinstate their bail.
4/23/75 5/7/75	Filed Pesponse to Correlaint from Braderick W. Ryan, Esq.
	Filed Response to Complaint from Frederick G. Zichm
6/3/75	Filed letter to defts. from Judge Foley dated April 22, 1975
57.57.15	1 11cd executed Commitment re: Richard Patrick Carrigan Man 27 1005
6/6/75	Filed Endorsement denving reduction of sentence etc
25/75	Filed Commitment of White

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DATE	PROCEEDINGS
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7/25/75	Filed Decision of Circuit.Court of Appeals granting motion to vacate the dismissal of appeal.
7/31/75	VFiled Application for copy of Court records and endorsement of
	Judge MacMahon attached thereto granting same. Carrigan.
11/17/75	
3/1/76 1	Filed transcript of proceedings held June 10, 1974 in Auburn, N.Y.
	before Hon. Lloyd F. MacMahon.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs.

INDICTMENT

Cry. NOCH 111

(VIO: Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 2314 and 2)

RICHARD PATRICK CARRIGAN and ROBERT EDWARD WHITE


COUNT I

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

That from on or about the 7th day of March, 1974, to on or about the 8th day of March, 1974, RICHARD PATRICK
CARRIGAN and ROBERT EDWARD WHITE, the defendants herein,
wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully did transport in interstate
commerce from Gloversville, in the State and Northern District
of New York, to Haverhill, in the State and District of
Massachusetts, stolen goods, wares and merchandise, that is,
a quantity of leather goods consisting of raw and treated cow
hides, goat skins, suede leather skins and ladies cow hide
coats, of the value of approximately \$37,475.00, knowing the
same to have been stolen.

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2314 and 2.

A TRUE BILL



UNITED STATES ANTORNEY

Armand Riccio de both

3/18/74 Deft Carrigan is arraigned and pleads not guilty. Bail reduced to \$5,000. Remanded to custody of Marshal. Deft White is arraigned and pleads not guilty. Bail reduced to \$5,000. Remanded to custody of Marshal.

Trial moved by US Atty. Jury drawn and sworn. Trial adjourned to June 12 at 9:30 AM 6/10/74 6/12/74 Trial continued

6/13/74 Trial continued. Govt rests. Mr. Riccio moves for dismissal on grounds stated. Motion denied. Trial moved for continuance to June 17.

10:10 AM Mr. Riccio sums up for defts. 10:40 AM Mr. French sums up for Govt 11:02 AM Judge MacMahon charges the jury, and they retire at 11:37 AM in charge of two sworn officers, to consider their verdict. The Jury, at

3:26 PM come into Court and say they find each defendant GUILTY AS CHARGED. Mr. Riccio moves to set aside the verdict on grounds stated. Motion denied. Mr. French moves to reinstate \$50,000 bail pending sentence. Motion denied Defendants are continued on \$5,000 bail. Pre-sentence investigation ordered Sentence set for July 23 at 10 AM at Auburn.

7/19/74 The Court advised defendant Carrigan of his right to speak in his own behalf. defendant spoke, his attorney spoke. Defendant is sentenced to be confined in any institution designated by the Attorney General for a period of eight years on count one. Defendant is granted the right to appeal, bail set at \$20,000. Remanded to custody of Marshal.

> The Court advised defendant White of his right to speak in his own behalf. defendant declined, his attorney spoke. Defendant is sentenced to be confined in any institution designated by the Attorney General for a period of eight years on count one. Defendant is granted the right to appeal, bail set at \$20,000. Remanded to custody of Marshal, pending posting of bail

> Motion for return of deft's property. Motion granted \$1,000 to Carrigan \$1,800 to White-no opposition by gov't. Gov't submit Order

733 - C.K .1.3	NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN District of NEW YORK Division	IE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	RICHARD PATRICK CARRIGAN	INDICTMENT VIO: Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 2314 and 2 INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN GOODS and AIDING & ABETTING	On	ed in open court this	GP 0 902-482
- 3.0°	UNITED	THE U	RIC	VIO: TE 2. INTERS: STOLEN	f true bill,	Filed in of	Badl, f

1/4/74

6/17/74

(The following proceedings took place in the presence of the jury).

THE COURT: The court and the jury have different functions. It is now my function and

duty to instruct you on the law that applies to this case, and it is your duty to accept the law as I give it to you, whether or not you agree with it, and to apply it to the facts as you find them, and in short I am the exclusive judge of the law, you on the other hand are the exclusive judges of the facts. You and you alone decide what weight, what effect and what value you will give to the evidence. You decide whether or not to believe a witness, and of course ultimately you decide the guilt or innocence of each defendant on trial in this case.

You are not to conclude from any rulings
I have made throughout this trial or any
questions that I have asked that I have any
opinion one way or another as to the guilt or
innocence of either of these defendants. That
decision is entirely up to you.

Now finding the fact is merely a process by which you, the jury, consider the exhibits and the testimony of all the witnesses, sift out what you believe, weigh it in the scale of your reasoning powers and draw such conclusions as your experience and common sense tell you

the evidence supports and justifies, and decide just where the truth lies in this case.

In this connection it is your memory of the evidence that controls, it is not the way I remember it, not the way the counsel remember it, if your memory squares with what the lawyers said, what they told you as to their version of the evidence during their closing arguments, you may accept what they said, but to the extent that you have a different memory, you are bound by your oath to rely on your memory.

Now in this connection sometimes juries are only out a little while and they send me a note saying they want the entire transcript or entire testimony of a witness. The court reporter's notes are not transcribed right away so there is no transcript, and you are supposed to rely on your memory. If you can't remember, one of your fellow jurors can remember and thereby help you refresh your recollection but if after indulging in that process you still would like to have the testimony of any witness read back to you, send me a note and the court reporter will read it back. But I ask you to

use some restraint about this. This has been a very simple case, the evidence isn't very complicated, and I am sure that one or more of you can remember it fully and you will all remember it after fully searching your memory and discussing it.

Now one of your most important functions is to determine just where the truth lies.

It is your exclusive function to decide which witness' you will believe, and this is so as to every witness, whether called by the Government or by the defense.

You are not to be influenced by the number of witnesses called by either side or by the number of documents received in evidence, you are concerned not with the quantity of the evidence but with the quality of the evidence.

The first test which you should apply in determining the trustworthiness of a witness is to measure what he says against your plain every day common sense. You are not bound to believe unreasonable statements or to accept testimony that defies your common sense or insults your intelligence just because the statements are made in a courtroom on a witness

stand under oath.

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You saw the witness' in this case. deciding whether to believe a witness you should consider not only what is said but also his conduct and his manner and his behavior on the stand. I saw you watching the witnesses here with particular care as they were testifying. obviously you were sizing them up. How did the witness impress you? Was the witness being frank with you? Was he being evasive? his version of the facts appear to be straightforward? Was he trying to conceal some of the facts? Was he just parroting answers? have any motive to testify falsely? Is he interested in any way in the outcome of this case? How strong or weak was his memory of important events? In short, can you rely on him, can you trust him, was he hostile or friendly to any party?

You ought to consider also his opportunity to know the facts about which he testified and the probability or improbability of what he said. How does his testimony add up when considered with all the evidence? How far does his story check out with the other evidence?

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Are there any inconsistencies in his story, and if so, how important are they?

Now the witnesses Greenberg, Ragone and Southwick testified that they had participated in the crime charged here. If you believe that, then they were accomplices and you should consider that fact in testing their credibility and weighing their testimony. Obviously a witness is not incapable of telling the truth about occurred simply because he is an accomplice. Nevertheless, you must examine an accomplice's testimony with special care and act upon it with caution.

In the prosecution of a crime, the Government is frequently called upon to use persons who are accomplices, often it has no choice.

They are properly used. After all the Government must rely upon witnesses to transaction such as they are, otherwise in many instances it would be difficult to detect and to prosecute wrongdoers. There is no requirement that the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated.

That simply means that his testimony be supported or backed up by other evidence. Conviction may rest upon the testimony of an accomplice

alone if you believe it.

The credibility of Greenberg, Ragone and Southwick like that of all the witnesses is for you and you alone to determine, taking into account the interest of the witness, his motive, any inducement or consideration he may have received or he may hope to receive from the Government, any hostility he may bear toward any defendant, any other evidence you recall which may reasonably be considered to influence and color his testimony.

Now the defendant Richard Carrigan testified as a witness. He was not required by law to do so, and his appearance as a witness was entirely voluntary on his part. If he had not testified his failure to take the stand could not have been considered by you in any manner in determining his guilt or innocence, but having taken the stand the law requires that his testimony be judged and appraised by the same standards supplied to the testimony of any other witness, giving consideration of course to his background, to his personality and to his natural interest in the outcome of this trial.

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The defendant Carrigan testified that he had been convicted of a crime in the past. This was brought out on cross-examination. You may consider that fact in determining his credibility and the weight to be given to his testimony, but you may not consider his conviction of any other crime as evidence that he committed the crime charged here.

The defendant Edward White did not take the A defendant is not required to take the stand and testify in his own behalf. has a constitutional right to depend and place his faith entirely upon the evidence presented by the Government. He has no burden of proof to sustain in this case. He has denied the charges made against him by his plea of not guilty and he is presumed to be innocent. The fact that White did not testify cannot be taken into consideration by you in any manner. You may not permit that fact to weigh in the slightest degree against him, nor should that fact even enter into your discussions or deliberations in any way in determining his guilt or innocence.

Now if you find that any witness has

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deliberately and willfully lied with respect to any material facts in his or her testimony offered at this trial, you may follow either one of two courses; you may accept as much of the witness' testimony as you believe, or if you wish you may reject his entire testimony.

Before discussing the crime charged here, I want to remind you that an indictment is a mere accusation. It is not evidence of the truth of the charge made, and you are to draw no inference of guilt from the mere fact that the defendant has been indicted. An indictment simply means that a defendant has been accused of a crime, and I have said to you that the defendant has denied--both defendants have denied the charge here by their pleas of not guilty, and the defendant Carrigan denied his guilt on the stand.

Now no defendant has any burden of proof to sustain in this case. He is under no obligation to produce any witnesses. He is presumed to be innocent, and this presumption of innocence continues throughout the trial and during the deliberations of the jury. presumption of innocence is overcome when and

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only when the Government establishes the guilt of a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now what do I mean by beyond a reasonable doubt? As the phrase implies, a reasonable doubt is a doubt that is based upon reason, a reason which appears in the evidence or in the lack of evidence. It is not some vague, speculative, imaginary doubt, nor a doubt based upon emotion, sympathy or prejudice, or based upon what some juror might regard as an unpleasant duty. The Government is not required to prove a defendant guilty beyond every possible doubt nor to an absolute or a mathematical certainty, because such measure of proof is usually impossible in human affairs.

You should review all of the evidence as you remember it. Sift out what you believe, discuss it, analyze it, weigh and compare your view of the evidence with your fellow jurors. If that process produces a solemn belief or conviction in your mind such as you would be willing to act upon without hesitation if this were an important matter of your own, then you may say that you have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.

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On the other hand, if after that process your mind is waivering or so uncertain that you would hesitate before acting if this were an important matter of your own, then you have not been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and your verdict must be not guilty.

Now the indictment in this case charges that from on or about March 7, 1974 to on or about March 8, 1974, Richard Patrick Carrigan and Robert Edward White, the defendants, wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully did transport in interstate commerce from Gloversville, in the State and Northern District of New York, to Haverhill, in the State and District of Massachusetts, stolen goods, wares and merchandise, that is, a quantity of leather goods consisting of raw and treated cow hides, goat skins, suede leather skins and ladies cow hide coats, of the value of approximately \$37,475.00, knowing the same to have been stolen.

In essence each defendant is charged with alleged violations of the United States statute which provides in pertinent part as follows: "Whoever transports in interstate

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commerce any goods, wares or merchandise of the value of \$5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be guilty of a crime."

You should consider each defendant separately. In order to convict a defendant of the crime charged here, the Government must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: (1) that from on or about March 7, 1974 to on or about March 8, 1974, the defendant whom you are considering knowingly and wilfully transported the merchandise described in the indictment in interstate commerce or that he knowingly aided and abetted or knowingly caused another or others to do so. This element, the first element is satisfied therefore if you find that the defendant whom you are considering knowingly and wilfully aided and abetted or caused another or others to transport the merchandise from Gloversville, New York to Haverhill, Massachusetts.

The second element is that the merchandise was stolen. The third element is that the defendant whom you are considering knew that

the merchandise had been stolen.

Now the second element is satisfied if you find anyone--it doesn't have to be the defendant--knowingly took these leather goods from the Frenville Company with an intent to steal it or to deprive Frenville Company of the benefit of ownership.

The fourth element is that the value of the merchandise was more than \$5,000. Value simply means the price which a willing buyer would pay and which a willing seller would accept.

You have heard me say it is not necessary for the Government to prove that these defendants themselves transported this merchandise, that it is sufficient that the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that they aided and abetted or caused another to transport these goods. The law provides that a person who aids and abets another to commit a crime is just as guilty of that crime as if he committed it himself. Accordingly you may find the defendant whom you are considering guilty of the crime charged in the indictment if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

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defendant aided or abetted some other person in the commission of the crime charged.

Here the Government contends that each of the defendants now on trial aided and abetted Ragone and Southwick to commit the crime of transporting stolen merchandise in interstate commerce, with knowledge of the fact that the merchandise had been stolen.

Before you can convict a defendant for aiding and abetting, however, you must find that the crime was committed by another, here Ragone and Southwick, and that the defendant whom you are considering knew the goods had been stolen and consciously associated himself with the criminal venture with the intent that his conduct would help it succeed in transporting the stolen goods in interstate commerce.

You must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was doing something to aid the crime or to forward the crime of the other person, that he was a conscious, knowing participant in the crime with a stake in its success, rather than a mere witness or spectator or bystander on the scene of a crime committed by another.

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Now possession of property recently stolen is not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which you the jury may reasonably draw the inference and conclusion in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence that the person in possession knew that the property had been stolen, and not only knew that it was stolen but also participated in some way in the theft of the property. And possession in one state of property recently stolen in another state if not satisfactorily explained is ordinarily a circumstance from which you may draw the inference and find in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence that the person in possession not only knew it to be stolen property but also transported it or caused it to be transported in interstate commerce.

The term "recently" is a relative term and has no fixed meaning. Whether property may be considered as recently stolen depends upon the nature of the property and all the facts and circumstances shown in the evidence. The longer a period of time since the theft, the more

doubtful becomes the inference which may reasonably be drawn from unexplained possession.

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence that the leather goods described in the indictment were stolen, and that while recently stolen the property was in the possession of the accused in another state, you may from those facts draw the inference not only that the leather goods were possessed by the accused with knowledge of it, but with knowledge of it that the property was stolen, but also that the accused transported the goods or caused them to be transported in interstate commerce with knowledge of the fact they were stolen.

Unless possession of the recently stolen property by the accused or possession by the accused in such other state is explained to the satisfaction of the jury by other facts and circumstances shown in the evidence.

In considering whether possession of recently stolen property has been satisfactorily explained, you are reminded that in the exercise of constitutional rights the defendants need not take the witness stand and testify. There

may be opportunity to explain possession by showing other facts and circumstances independent of the testimony of the defendants.

You will also bear in mind that the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. It is the exclusive function of the jury to determine whether the fact and circumstances are shown by the evidence warrant an inference which the law permits you to draw from possession of recently stolen property. If any possession the accused may have had of recently stolen property is consistent with innocence, or if you entertain a reasonable doubt of guilt, you must acquit the accused.

Now possession is of two kinds, it can be actual possession, which simply means having direct, physical control over a thing at a given time, such as holding it in one's hand or carrying it in one's car or directing where it go. Constructive possession simply means the power at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing either directly or through another person or persons.

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You will note that in describing the elements of the crime I have said that the
defendant must have acted knowingly. An act
is done knowingly if it is done voluntarily
and purposefully, the exercise of a free choice,
and not because of mistake, accident, mere
negligence or other innocent reasons.

In determing whether a defendant acted knowingly and intentionally it is obviously impossible to look into his mind. Knowledge and intent, however, may be proved by circumstantial evidence. You may thus infer knowledge and intent from a defendant's conduct, his act his statement and from all the surrounding circumstance. In short, actions speak louder than words when we are trying to decide what is in a person's mind.

You will note also that in describing these elements I have said that the defendant must have acted wilfully. You will note that the indictment uses the word unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully. This means that the defendants must know what they are doing, that he consciously does the act which the law prohibits and that he intended to commit those acts. It

does not mean that he must know that his acts violate the law, he simply must consciously know what he is doing.

An act is done knowingly if it is done voluntarily and purposely and not because of mistake, negligence or other innocent reasons.

An act is wilfull if it is done knowingly and deliberately and with an evil motive or purpose.

Unlawfully simply means that the act is something prohibited by law.

In determining whether a defendant acted knowingly and intentionally you should consider all of the circumstances shown in the evidence. You should consider such evidence as you recal and believe as to whether a defendant tried to cover up what he was doing, as to whether he tried in any way to conceal his identity, as to whether he dealt in cash and if so why, and any other circumstances shown in the evidence which tends to show whether he acted with a conscious and guilty knowledge.

You should consider each defendant separately.

If you find that the Government has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable

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as I have given them to you in the instructions, or that the defendant whom you are considering did not knowingly aid and abet another in the commission of the crime charged in the indictment, you should not hesitate to return a verdict of not guilty, as to that defendant.

On the other hand, if you find that the Government has proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt all four elements of the crime which I have given to you, or the defendant to whom you are considering knowingly aided and abetted another in the commission of the crime charged in the indictment, you should return a verdict of guilty as to that defendant.

You are instructed that the question of possible punishment of the defendant in the event of a conviction is no concern of yours and should not in any sense enter into or influence your deliberation. The duty of imposing sentence in the event of a conviction rests exclusively upon the court.

The function of the jury is to weigh the evidence in the case and determine the guilt or the innocence of the defendant solely upon

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the basis of such evidence.

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When you retire to the jury room, you will treat one another with consideration and respect, as I know you will. If differences of opinion arise, your discussions should be dignified, calm, intelligent.

Your verdict must be based on the evidence and the law, the evidence which was presented in this case as you remember it end the law as I have given it to you in this charge.

You are entitled to your own opinion. juror should acquiesce in a verdict against his individual judgment. Nevertheless I would poi t out that no one should enter a jury room with such pride of opinion that he would refuse to change his mind no matter how convincing the arguments of his fellow jurors. Discussion and deliberation are part of our jury process and your deliberations should be approached in that spirit. Talk out your differences. Each of you should decide the case for himself after thoroughly reviewing the evidence and frankly discussing it with your fellow jurors with an open mind and with a desire to reach a verdict. If you do that you will be acting in the true

democratic process of the American jury system.

There are twelve of you on this jury, the remaining alternate will be excused before you retire for your deliberations. Any verdict must be the unanimous verdict of all of you and it must represent the honest conclusion of each of you.

I submit the case to you with every confidence that you will fully measure up to the oath which you took as members of the jury.

Decide the issues submitted to you fairly and impartially and without fear or favor.

Now members of the jury if you find that the Government has failed to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, you should acquit that defendant. If you find that a defendant has not violated the law, you should not hesitate for any reason to render a verdict of not guilty as to him. But on the other hand, if you find as to the defendant you are considering that the Government has established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you should not hesitate because of sympathy nor any other reason to render a verdict of guilty.

1 When you retire to your jury room, you will elect from among your number a foreman or forelady to speak for you, and your foreman 3 or forelady will return an oral verdict in open court as to each defendant of guilty or 5 not guilty. 6 7 Are there any exceptions, gentlemen? 8 MR. RICCIO: No, sir. MR. FRENCH: The government has none. 9 THE COURT: The alternate jurors now ex-10 cused from further consideration of this case 11 12 until 9:30 tomorrow morning. Thank you. 13 (The jury retired at 11:37 A.M.) (2:35 P.M. the jury was returned to the 14 15 courtroom). 16 THE CLERK: Ladies and gentlemen of the 17 jury, have you agreed upon a verdict, and if 18 so how do you find and who shall say for you? 19 JURY FOREMAN: Yes, we have reached a verdict, Your Honor. We find both defendants 20 21 guilty as charged. 22 THE CLERK: Harken onto your verdict, 23 ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as the court 24 has recorded it. You say you find both 25 defendants guilty as charged and so say you al!?

CHORUS OF VOICES: Yes.

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THE COURT: I want to thank you for the very conscientious attention you gave to this case. You are excused now until tomorrow morning at 9:30.

(The jury was excused and the following proceedings took place outside the presence of the jury).

MR. RICCIO: Your Honor, at this time I would move on behalf of the defendants on the verdict of the jury to have it set aside on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.

THE COURT: Motion denied.

MR. FRENCH: If the Court please, the Government now moves that the bail originally fixed in this case in the sum of \$50,000, which was reduced on the motion of counsel, Mr. Riccio, to \$5,000, be reinstated to the original sum fixed by the Court when the indictment was returned and was fixed by the Magistrate at the time of the arrest, and I show to the Court the Department of Justice record sheets of these two defendants, call the Court's attention to the fact the defendant Carrigan was released or